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Loss of wages is the major risk to workers in modem industrial society.
When wages are interrupted, laborers who have little savings and no other
source of income face severe economic privation.' And when a worker is
the sole breadwinner of a family, his wage loss is likely to bring poverty
and ill-health upon the entire household.
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To protect workers and their families from some of the economic con-
sequences of income loss, a network of social security laws has been developed.
Old age and survivor's insurance (OASI) offers limited compensation for
unemployment resulting from superannuation and premature death.3 Unem-
ployment insurance4 partially indemnifies able-bodied workers for income
1. "The vast majority of wage earners are dependent for their livelihood solely or
mainly on the regular exercise of some trade. When this activity stops temporarily or
permanently, owing to an industrial accident, sickness, invalidity, old age, premature
death or involuntary unemployment, the income of the worker's family is seriously affected
or completely disappears." INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, SoCIAL INSURANCE 1 (Studies
and Reports, Series M, No. 12, 1936). The economic consequences are of greater severity
in the worker's case, "than in the middle classes deriving their income from property,
business, or profession, where the continuity of income is not so closely dependent upon
continuity of effort." RUBINOW, SOCIAL INSURANCE 8 (1916). Further on this theme are
PINK, FRlEDom FROm FEAR (1944); MILLIs & MONTGOmERY, LABoR's RISKS AND SOCIAL
INSURANCE (1938).
2. In an agricultural society almost every member of a household unit contributes to
the sustenance of the family. But although today the family remains the basic economic
unit, industrialization has made the economic security of nine out of every ten American
families hinge upon the labor of one individual. When his labor is terminated, his entire
mtnage suffers from his wage loss. Falk, Read & Sanders, Some Problems in the Formu-
lation of a Disability Insurance Program, 6 LAw & CONTEM. PRoB. 645 (1939).
3. On the problem of the industrially old worker, see MILLIS & MONTGmMERY, LAB0R'S
RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 353-408 (1938) ; MUNTZ, GROWTH AND TRENDS IN SOCIAL
SECURITY, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL CONFERENCE BOARD, STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL AND
CoLLECrIvE SECURITY No. 6, 125-160 (1949) (Hereinafter cited as NICB, STUDIES No.)
(Hereinafter, Old Age and Survivor's Insurance will be cited as OASI).
4. For a comprehensive analysis of unemployment insurance in the United States, see
Burns, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L. J. 1
(1945) ; Witte, Development of Unemployment Compensation, id. at 21.
5. Thirty-four state laws require that the claimant, to be eligible for unemployment
benefits, be "able to work and available for work." Freeman, Able to Work and Avail-
able For Work, 55 YALE L. J. 123, 124 n. 8 (1945). Most of the others have similar pro-
visions. Ibid.
Five states have amended this requirement in an attempt to plug the gap in social insur-
ance protection afforded their workers. These states provide that a worker is not ineligible
for unemployment benefits if disability occurs after he registers for work or files a claim
for benefits and no suitable work can be found after his illness began. Md. Laws c. 270,
§ 4(c) (1945) ; Mont. Laws c. 19, § 4(c) (1945) ; NEv. STATS. c. 187, § 4(c) (1945) ; Idaho
Sess. Laws c. 269, § 66(e) (1947); Tenn. Pub. Acts c. 29, § 4(c) (1947). But only those
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losses from such factors as cyclical unemployment, lockouts, or temporary
layoffs. And workmen's compensation programs provide cash and medical
benefits when workers are injured in the course of employment.6
Workers, however, are not protected against the loss of income resulting
from ordinary illness and accident not connected with their jobs. This gap
in the structure of social security warrants immediate attention. Each day
about two million laborers are kept from working by a temporary disability.
7
The resulting wage loss to persons with incomes less than $2,500 is almost
$900 million per year ;8 when medical expenses are added, the total loss for
registered as unemployed or those who have filed a claim for unemployment benefits are
eligible. Hence a worker must be unemployed when disability strikes. And even where
sickness occurs while unemployed, the worker is rendered ineligible by the availability of
suitable work.
6. The most common phrase used in the state statutes is injury "arising out of and in
the course of employment."
Unlike OASI and unemployment insurance, workmen's compensation is left entirely
in state hands. No federal statutes, except those governing maritime workers, railroad
employees and certain classes of federal employees, are concerned with work-connected
disabilities. All 48 states have adopted workmen's compensation schemes. While they vary
considerably in benefits, financing, and administration, they are all designed to aid the
sustenance and rehabilitation of the industrially injured worker. For an excellent and
comprehensive analysis of the problems inherent in this type of insurance, and how the
several states have met them, see REEDE, ADEQUACY OF VORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
(1947).
7. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 2893, 81st Cong., 1st
Sess. 1092 (1949) (statement of Dr. A. J. Altmeyer, Commissioner for the Social Se-
curity Administration).
Among the more important factors determining the prevalence of disability are the
following: age, sex, type of employment, and income. The latter is most significant in
pointing up the need for insurance against wage loss. Work days lost per worker
increase as the income scale decreases, placing the greatest burden upon lower paid
laborers. The following table, taken from Falk, Sanders & Federman, Disability Among
Gainfidly Occupied Persons 9 (Social Security Board, Bureau of Research & Statistics,
Memo. No. 61, 1945), illustrates:





1,500 to 1,999 5.7
2,000 to 2,999 5.7
3,000 to 4,999 5.5
5,000 and over 5.2
In addition, it has been estimated that from four to six times as many workers suffer
from illness as from industrial accidents. Thus the need for disability compensation
is greater than the need for workmen's compensation. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN
AMERIcAN INDUSTRY 798 (5th ed. 1941).
8. MIL.IS & MONTGOMERY, LABOR'S RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 237-8 (1938). A
valuable study of the extent of illness was made in 1919 by the Illinois State Health
Insurance Commission. Examination of the experience of mutual benefit associations with
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lower income families comes to some $2 billion per year.9 The result is a
decrease in purchasing power, a drain on charitable funds,'L and a lowering
of health standards."
The federal government has done little to meet this problem. Only railroad
workers have any sort of disability plan.12 Though proposed health insurance
plans would provide medical care to disabled persons,13 they are yet far from
being a reality. And even were health insurance set up, the worker and his
family would still need cash income for normal living requirements.
Nor has voluntary insurance provided an adequate solution to the disability
663,163 wage-earning members indicated that 8.87o of these workers lost 207o or more
of what earnings there would have been absent some disabling illness. REPORT OF THE
HEALTH INSURANCE COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS 151-2 (1919).
9. MILLs & MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 8, at 238. See also Hearings before
Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 4120, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1936). The coin-
ciding of medical expenses and wage loss heightens the seriousness of the disability prob-
lem. See Address by Mary Donlon, Chairman, New York State Workmen's Compensa-
tion Board, over radio station WNBC, Dec. 31, 1949.
Tremendous costs are also borne by employers, resulting from absenteeism, labor
turnover, and selecting and training new employees or reserves. See DAUGHERTY, Op. cit.
supra note 7, at 113-114; SLiCH TR, THE TURNOvER OF FACTORY LABOR 403-405 (1919).
10. "The public assistance rolls reflect serious financial straits to which many fam-
ilies have been reduced by the disability of the breadwinner. Estimates of the number of
persons on the public assistance rolls whose need is attributable to disability range from
770,000 to 920,000 . . . about 387,000 were children [in 1949] in 125,000 families whose
fathers were disabled and who were receiving aid to dependent children.... The num-
ber of families receiving aid from private welfare sources has not been estimated, but
they add considerably to the total. Others in need of help never come to any agency;
studies made by the Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance show that many fam-
ilies prefer to live in want rather than turn to public aid or private charity." FEDERAL
SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1949, 58 (1950).
The Report does not state whether these statistics are limited to non-occupational tempor-
ary disability.
11. ". . . Whether or not there is social insurance, substantially the same costs exist
in the form of losses of earnings from sickness, disability.., and in medical bills. When
social insurance is lacking, these charges appear in the costs borne by the families con-
cerned and the public that also foots a considerable part of the bill for relief and public
welfare services, and in the loss of potential business and national income when many
families are in economic distress. With social insurance, large losses suffered by a part
of the population are distributed over the entire population. The relatively small but
regular amounts paid out in social insurance benefits have an importance far beyond
their size, both for those who receive them and for the economy as a whole." Id. at 7, 8.
12. See FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, RAILROAD
TEMPORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM (1949).
13. Health insurance schemes have been advocated for almost half a century. They
are summarized in NICB, C014PULSORY SICKNESS COMPENSATION FOR NEW YORK STATE,
17-21 (1947). See also Comment, The Essentials of An Adequate Health Program,
59 YALE L. J. 292 (1950). The main goals of these proposals have been prevention of
illness and assurance of medical care, rather than compensation for wage loss.
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problem.14 Within the last decade individual medical care plans' 5 and
individual and group insurance covering wage losses have offered a greater
degree of protection than ever before. 1 6 But most workers still cannot afford
individual coverage.lT And even when they can, bad disability risks, such
as women, older workers, and non-whites are often refused policiesls
Moreover, most of the relatively few group insurance plans in existence
require the employee to have from 10 to 20 years of service before he
becomes entitled to benefits.19 And fraternal group sickness benefit plans
cover only a small minority of American workers.2 0  In short, too few
workers have any coverage, and too many have inadequate protection.
Recognizing the widespread prevalence of disability and the inadequacy
of existing protection, four states-Rhode Island, California, New Jersey
and New York-recently have adopted compulsory disability insurance.
2
1
14. "Private insurance provides some protection against earnings loss during short-
term illnesses through health and accident policies. Few families in the low and middle
income groups, however, can afford to purchase private insurance contracts . . . and such
contracts are not available to most persons in middle or older age groups or to persons in
occupations that present a risk to health." FEDERaAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECmURTY
ADmINIsTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1949, 58 (1950).
15. To the extent that medical care plans, such as Blue Cross, meet the medical
expenses of a sick worker, they make a real contribution to the worker's security. But
many of these plans do not include as benefits cash compensation for wage-loss. For the
number of persons covered by private medical insurance see id. at 24 (taking the view
that even as to medical care these plans are unsatisfactory because they don't reach those
who need it most and because only partial protection against medical costs is afforded).
16. See statistics for group coverage in NICB, STUDIES No. 1, BUDGETING THE COSTS
OF ILLNESS 65 (1947).
17. Hearings, supra note 7, at 1092. See note 14 supra.
18. "Under private insurance, great care must be exercised in the selection of the
risks.... ." Hearings, supra note 7, at 1313 (statement by Dr. Altmeyer). See also Falk,
Sanders & Federman, supra note 7, at 7; NICB, COMPULSORY SICKNESS COMPENSATION
FOR NEW YORE STATE 66, Table 15 (1947). See also note 14 supra.
19. See FEDERAL SECUITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
REPORT 1949, 58 (1950); COLLECTIVE BARGAINING PRovISIoNs, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLANS,
PART I-HEALTir, WELFARE, AND INSURANCE PLANS (U.S. Dept. Labor, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, Sept. 1949); SELEcTED EXCERPTS FROM COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS
(U.S. Dep't. Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, March 1949 rev.).
20. See FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
REPORT 1949, 58 (1950). For a description see NICB, STUmES No. 1, BUDGETING THE
COSTS OF ILLNESS 3, 16, 37 (1947).
21. R.I. Acts c. 1200 (1942) ; CAL. GEN. LAWS act 8780d, §§ 150-462 (Supp. 1947);
N. J. Laws c. 110, §§ 1-33 (1948) ; N. Y. Laws c. 600, §§ 200-242 (1949).
In other countries, temporary disability insurance has generally been related to perma-
nent disability health insurance. The first compulsory sickness insurance law with broad
coverage, enacted in Germany in 1883, provided both medical services and cash benefits
related to wage loss. By 1900, three countries had adopted similar insurance programs.
A few more countries joined in before 1914, including Great Britain. Following World
War I, and especially during the 1930's there was a rapid expansion, with many South
American nations adding plans. Mfore than 50 million workers were covered in all these
[Vol. 60 : 647
1951] iNSURANCE AGAINST TEMPORARY DISABILITY 651
Their programs are designed to compensate workers, during a limited time,
for about 50 percent of wages lost because of disability arising outside the
course of employment. Like other social insurance schemes in the United
States, the programs are financed by a payroll tax upon all covered
employment.
These laws are likely to be looked upon by other states as examples to be
copied or rejected. Fortunately, there is sufficient diversity among them
to illustrate alternative programs available to a state contemplating the
adoption of compulsory insurance. The existing laws will be tested by their
ability to meet three underlying objectives of disability insurance: (1) to
provide broad coverage and liberal eligibility requirements so that the entire
labor force will be protected against disability loss; (2) to extend benefits
adequate to assure the disabled worker a decent minimum of economic
security; and (3) to distribute the cost of insurance in the most equitable
and efficient method possible.
COVERAGE AND ELIGIBILITY
Coverage
Since no one is immune from illness or injury, all workers should receive
protection against the risk of disability-induced wage loss. But the statutes
exempt from coverage several categories of gainfully occupied persons: the
self-employed ;22 those who work for employers hiring three or less per-
plans. China, India and the United States were the only important nations in which there
was no government supported sickness insurance. See DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEmS IN
AMERICAN INDUSTRY 798-9 (5th ed. 1949) ; RUBINOW, SoCIAL I SuRANcE 224-280 (1916) ;
WOLFENDEN, THE REAL MEANING OF SOCIAL INSURANCE 51-53, 56-60 (1932); FEDERAL
SECURITY AGENCY, TEMpORARY DISABILuIr INSURANCE 4 (rev. ed. 1949). Since the end
of World War II, England, France, Belgium, Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands
have enacted legislation to increase protection against risks of income loss from dis-
ability, and to remove or reduce financial obstacles to medical care. Ibid.
There are several points of similarity between the various compulsory systems: (1)
Almost all plans are contributory, requiring payments from employees or the state in
addition to those made by employers. (2) In a majority, the funds are built up from
employee-employer contributions, with the state contributing only enough to cover admin-
istration. (3) Four kinds of benefits are commonly provided: (a) cash sickness benefit,
beginning after a three or four day waiting period, extending about 26 weeks, amounting
to 50 or 60 percent of customary wages and depending on a certain number of previously
paid-in contributions; (b) lump sum funeral expenses equal to 30 or 40 times the basic
daily wage; (c) comprehensive medical benefits, including services of physicians, hospitals
and pharmacies; (d) maternity benefits. DAUGHERTY, op. cit. supra, at 798-99.
Only in the United States has unemployment insurance preceded temporary disability
insurance. Temporary disability insurance in this country has differed from that in other
nations perhaps because it has been considerably influenced by the unemployment insur-
ance pattern.
22. E.g., R. I. Acts c. 1200, § 2(7) (1942) ; id. § 7(e) (3).
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sons ;23 and employees of governmental units or non-profit organizations. 24
Little justification can be found for exempting the self-employed. The
primary basis for exempting them from disability insurance, as well as other
social security laws, is administrative feasibility.25 Since the self-employed
do not derive income from a payroll, they would have to compute profits
and losses in order to determine the amount of their contribution. To require
this at weekly or monthly intervals might impose a heavy burden. Moreover,
the state would have to make frequent entries on thousands of individual
records. But the development of practicable administrative procedures for
tax collecting shows that these arguments are without force. The 1950
amendments to the Social Security Act have broadened OASI coverage to
include many urban self-employed persons, 26 and have devised an expedient
tax return tied to income tax schedules.2 7  Thus instead of the tax being
deducted from a weekly wage check, it can be paid annually or quarterly,
simultaneously with the income tax. States could adopt a similar device.
Having computed net income for federal tax purposes, the self-employed
person could simply copy this computation for the state.
Discrimination against those who work for employers hiring three or less
persons also has no reasonable basis. 23 Advocates of the small-shop exemp-
23. E.g., N. Y. Laws c. 600, §202(1) (1949). But see CAL. GEN. LAws act 8780d,
§§ 8.5, 151 (Supp. 1947) (employers of one or more are included).
24. E.g., N. Y. Laws c. 600, § 201(6) (1949).
25. See, e.g., Falk, Reed & Sanders, Some Problems in the Foronulation of a Dis-
ability Insurance Program, 6 LAw & CoNTrma. PRoD. 645 (1939).
26. Pub. L. No. 734, Chap. 809 (1950), U. S. CODE CONG. SEav. 561 (1950).
Their coverage is made compulsory. "The history of voluntary social insurance in
other countries indicates definitely that only a very small proportion of all eligible indi-
viduals actually elect to participate. Moreover, the ones who do elect to participate are
usually not those of average or below average income. In addition, voluntary coverage
would probably attract almost exclusively people who are already aged and others who
can foresee a large possible return for their contributions; as a result, the program would
be faced with adverse selection of risks and a serious drain on the ... fund." SEN. REP.
No. 1669 (May 17, 1950), cited in U. S. CODE CONG. SERv., 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 3287,
3299 (1950).
27. "The fact that almost all full-time and a large proportion of part-time self-
employed persons have for the last few years been required to file income-tax returns has
radically changed the outlook for extending coverage to this group. It has been demon-
strated that income reports can be obtained from the great majority of self-employed, and
it is now apparent that the coverage of the insurance system can be extended to them by
tying in a self-supporting system for social insurance with the income tax. Certain items
now reported for income-tax purposes can be used as the contribution base for old-age and
survivor's insurance and entered on a social-security report form. In the main, these items
are net income from a business, profession, or farm (schedule C of the Federal income-tax
return), and from partnerships, syndicates, etc. (schedule E)." The Reports of the
Advisory Council on Social Security to the Senate Committee on Finance, SEN. Doc.
No. 208, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 15 (1948). See also Packer & Liebowitz, Coverage of the
Self-Employed Under the Old-Age and Survivors Ihsurance, 36 CALmr. L. REv. 61 (1948).
28. "Continuation of the size-of-firm exclusion . . . cannot be justified . .. on the
ground of administrative difficulty. Nor can the exclusion be justified on the ground
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tion claim that it eliminates the handling of thousands of firms which other-
wise would overburden administration of the program. But California has
demonstrated that small shops can be effectively covered without admin-
istrative difficulty.29 And the seventeen states which have discontinued this
exemption under unemployment insurance likewise report beneficial results?3
Elimination of the small-shop exemption would also avoid the unfairness
resulting from imposing different tax liability on competing firms of slightly
different size.Y-
The exemption of employees of governmental units and non-profit organiza-
tions is a carryover from the Social Security law. These exemptions were
written into that statute presumably because of Constitutional barriers against
federal taxation of certain state government agencies and a long-established
federal policy against taxing charitable institutions.3 2  An individual state,
however, could cover its own employees by contributing out of general reve-
nues what would normally be the employer's share. It could also require con-
tributions by its employees. And states could extend coverage to employees of
non-profit units by imposing a payroll tax directly on such organizations.
that the services performed by workers in small firms are different from the services per-
formed by workers in larger firms. This exclusion is based solely on size-of-firm and not
on nature of employment. Their services would be covered if performed in a larger firm."
Report of the Technical Staff of the House Committee of Ways and Means, cited in,
REPORT OF THE NEwv YORK STATE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PLACEMENT AND UNEMPLOY-
MENT INSURANCE FOR THE YEAR 1947, 3. All employers regardless of size are within the
provisions of OASI. They are required to prepare quarterly reports, and make quarterly
contributions and withholding payments. "That system [OASI] has found coverage of
small employers to be administratively feasible." Id. at 2.
29. For the period May 21, 1946 to March 31, 1948 California spent a little more than
half of the monies available for administration, indicating little, if any, difficulty in handling
small firms. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, CALIFORNIA DIsABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM
39, Table 4 (1948).
30. A study of experience in 13 of these states revealed the following information:
Reports add up to evidence overwhelmingly in favor of full coverage. Limited coverage
is exposed as an administrative, a social, and an economic handicap. A consensus
revealed: "Administrative difficulties are overshadowed by administrative advan-
tages." "All states are in agreement in reporting no unwholesome economic effect on
small firms which can be charged to unemployment-insurance coverage. On the contrary,
several states emphatically point to beneficial economic results." REPORT OF THE NEW
YORK STATE ADVISORY COUNCIL ON PLACEMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR
THE YEAR 1947, 2, 3.
The 13 states reporting represent both large and small, whether based on population
or geography, and include predominantly agricultural as well as industrial common-
wealths. E.g., Arkansas, Delaware, Idaho, Massachusetts, Nevada, Pennsylvania.
31. Although the taxation phase of disability insurance will be discussed more fully
at pages 666-67 infra, it is appropriate to mention here that some states require contribu-
tions from employers. This tax cost is ultimately reflected in price. Hence a producer
not required to contribute enjoys a distinct price advantage through mere fortuity rather
than wise business judgment.
32. Internal Revenue Code § 101 (6). And see Graves v. New York ex rel O'Keefe,
306 U. S. 466 (1939) ; New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572 (1946).
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The exemption from taxation of these groups is based on the notion that they
should be financially unhampered to devote all their monies to charitable,
religious, and educational ends. While these aims are socially desirable, so
is the provision of disability benefits. In the event, however, that states are
unwilling to extend mandatory coverage in these areas, coverage could be
extended on a voluntary basis similar to that recently accomplished under the
1950 amendments to OASI.
3
Eligibility
Qualifying Earnings or Employment. Since the purpose of disability insur-
ance is to protect workers from income loss, only those gainfully employed,
or those unemployed but seeking work, are made eligible for benefits. Among
the four states there are two criteria for determining whether a claimant is
an active member of the labor force. One is a wage test. The claimant must
show minimum earnings varying from $100 to $600 during a base year before
he became disabled.3 4 In contrast, the second test requires only that the worker
33. The 1950 Amendments to the Social Security Act, Pub. L. No. 734, Chap. 809,
81st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 218 (Aug. 28, 1950), U. S. CoDEr CoNG. Smtv. 561, 596-99 (1950)
made provision for covering under OASI the following workers:
Federal employees: Federal employees are covered unless their service is already
covered by a retirement system established by a law of the United States. There are other
"unless" clauses, but of minor importance.
Employees of transportation systems operated by a state or political subdivision: If
since 1936 the state or political subdivision has acquired or acquires a transportation system
from private ownership after 1936 all employees will be covered unless the state or sub-
division has a constitutionally protected retirement system for services performed in con-
nection with that transportation system.
State and local employees: All state and local government employment which is not
under an existing retirement system could be covered through voluntary agreements
between the states and the Federal Security Administrator. Voluntary agreements must
be made with respect to specific coverage groups, i.e., all the employees of a state or city,
or, separate coverage groups of employees engaged in the performance of single proprie-
tary functions. These federal-state agreements can be terminated on two years notice,
but only after they have been in effect for five years. While the agreement is in effect,
the Federal Government can enforce the state's duty to pay the required contributions by
deducting the defaulted amount from payments otherwise due to the states under other
titles of the Social Security Act (chiefly federal grants for public assistance).
Employees of religious, charitable, and certain other non-profit organizations: Service
performed for an organization exempt from income tax under § 101 (6) of the Internal
Revenue Code (non-profit religious, charitable and educational institutions) is excluded
from OASI coverage unless the organization files a certificate expressing its desire to be
covered. The certificate must contain the assent of at least two-thirds of its employees.
Where the certificate is valid, both employer and employees are subject to such taxes in
the same manner as a private employer and his employees. The organization may ter-
minate coverage only after eight years and with two years advance notice-making a
minimum of ten years coverage.
34. CAL. GEN. LAws act 8780d, §§ 6(q), 205(c) (Supp. 1947) ($300); N. J. Laws,
1948, c. 110, §§ 17, 20 (30 times weekly benefit amount) ; R. I. Acts, 1949, c. 2206, § 3(12)
($100).
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have been employed for four consecutive weeks prior to the commencement
of disability ;35 or, in the case of an unemployed worker, that except for the
disability, he be qualified for unemployment compensation.30
Both tests are likely to render ineligible some workers. Emphasis on
wages might operate to disqualify lower paid workers, seasonal employees,
and new recruits to the labor force.37 Similarly, under an employment test
workers obtaining jobs for the first time or returning to work after a lay-off
will be ineligible until they have worked the required number of weeks. Any
test based on previous wages or employment is bound to raise these problems.
But the inequities can be minimized by keeping the requirements low, such
as minimum earnings of $100 a year under a wage test or a four weeks' period
under an employment test.
Disqualifying Income. Under existing statutes income received by a dis-
abled worker ordinarily affects his right to benefits. In California and New
York the worker may receive both wages and disability benefits, but they must
not total more than his benefits alone would otherwise provide.38 Rhode
Island, on the other hand, allows complete disability benefits even when full
wages are paid.39 New Jersey, adopting a mid-way position, restricts the
total which the worker can receive to the amount of regular weekly wages
earned prior to disability.40
These provisions are identical with the respective states' unemployment insurance laws.
"Base period" is defined in the case of Rhode Island, for example, as the calendar
year immediately preceding the first Sunday in April of any year. R. I. Acts, 1949, c.
2206, § 3(12). This means that each year a worker has a different base year from the
one he had the previous year.
35. See N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600. §§ 203, 204.
36. Id. §§ 207(1) (2). Relating eligibility of the disabled unemployed back to the
qualifications of unemployment insurance makes the wage test relevant again. But New
York has established an additional category of qualifications for unemployed claimants.
If the claimant did not earn unemployment insurance qualifying wages, he may still be
eligible for disability benefits if he earned $13 in covered employment in each of 20 out of
the 30 weeks preceding the last day worked. Ibid.
37. ". . . eligibility for [unemployment insurance] benefits usually specifies earnings
equal to some multiple (usually 30 times) of the benefit amount. Thus, the increase
in the minimum benefit amount in California to $10 necessitates earnings of at least
$300 [during a base period] which, it is estimated, will render ineligible 20 percent
of formerly eligible claimants." UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION CONTRIDUTiONS, BENE-
FITS AND RESERvES, SOCIAL SEcuRITY BOARD, EMPnLOYMENT SECURITY MEMO. No. 5, 17
(1940).
38. CAL. GEN. LAwS act 8780d, § 208 (Supp. 1947); N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, §§
205(6), 206.
See also discussion in Note, Legislative Medicine for the Sick Worker, 2 STAN. L.
REv. 345, 355, 356 (1950).
39. R. I. Acts, 1943, c. 1367, §§ 2(1) (13) (14) (15). See also BouRAu OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, COMPARIsoN OF TEMPORARY DISARILITY INSURANCE LAWS, DECEMBER 1,
1949, 4 (U. S. Dep't Labor); STUDIES ix DisABUiTy INSURANcE 3 (N. Y. Dep't Labor
19-49).
40. N. J. Laws, 1948, c. 110, §§ 6, 15(f).
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Of these provisions, duplication limited to the amount of previous wages
seems preferable. When the employer agrees to continue wages during
disability, he is granting in effect a wage increase which should be permitted to
supplement the state-created benefit.41 But limiting the total to regular wages
is advisable to reduce malingering. Temptation may be too great if an
employee can receive more income by remaining idle than by working.
A worker entitled to workmen's compensation benefits is ineligible for dis-
ability benefits for the same injury in all the states except Rhode Island.
42
Rhode Island pays benefits from both programs, provided the combined
benefits do not exceed 85 per cent of the worker's average wage on his last
job.43 This duplication is undesirable. The function of disability insurance
is to fill the gap in the worker's security by protecting him from non-occupa-
tional injury and illness. He is already covered for work-connected disability.
If workmen's compensation benefits are adequate, duplication is a waste of
funds. And if benefits are inadequate the remedy is to liberalize them within
the workmen's compensation program itself, not to subsidize that program
from disability insurance. For one thing, the two programs may be financed
from different sources.44 Furthermore, workmen's compensation programs,
41. Some employers have established, as a result of their own initiative or through
collective bargaining, formal wage-continuation plans. Others, with no formal plans, con-
tinue to pay wages to sick employees anyway. Often, these payments amount to a fixed
percentage of regular weekly wages.
The California and New York rule, reducing state benefits to the difference between
the employer's continuing wage and the appropriate benefit amount, discourages such
wage-continuance plans. For whether or not the employer maintains wages, his employee
will receive the same number of dollars. Hence why not allow the insurance, for which
the employer helps pay anyway, supply the full benefit?
42. There should be one exception to this disqualification rule. "Workmen's compen-
sation payments for some other incapacity, such as a permanent physical impairment, do
not involve duplication. Consequently, receipt of permanent partial or total disability
benefits under workmen's compensation for a disability of prior origin should not affect
a claimant's right to temporary disability insurance. The former are compensation for
decrease in earning power, the latter, for current loss of earnings. .. ." FEDERAL SECURITY
AGENc Y, TE PoRARY DISAIwuTY INSURA C E 24 (rev. ed. 1949).
Often there is some difficulty in determining whether a particular injury or disease
is work-connected. And delays are not infrequently encountered in workmen's compen-
sation proceedings. During this period the worker receives no benefit payments. Here,
disability insurance can fill the gap by extending benefits to the claimant until the work-
men's compensation issue is settled. If the worker is not entitled to workmen's com-
pensation, he will continue under disability insurance. If, however, he is entitled, then
disability benefits cease and workmen's compensation commences. The disability insurance
fund can then be reimbursed by the workmen's compensation fund. Such is the law of
California and New York. See, e.g., N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, § 206(2).
43. R. I. Laws, 1949, c. 2194, § 5 (3).
44. Under most workmen's compensation programs employers bear the entire cost.
But in disability insurance, contributions are either shared by employers and employees,
or are made entirely by employees.
In computing the costs of a disability program if disability insurance benefits are
to be paid simultaneously with workmen's compensation benefits, actuarial data on state-
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unlike the present cash disability insurance schemes, provide medical services
as well as compensation for lost wages. As long as this difference continues,
all benefits for workers injured on the job should be disbursed through the
workmen's compensation system, in order to insure proper allocation of funds
between compensation for wage loss and medical expenses.
Extent of Disability. A disability is compensable under the existing laws
when the claimant is physically unable to perform the regular duties of
employment at his most recent job.45 There has been suggested a more
stringent test of disability: total incapacity to perform any remunerative work
which the employee is qualified to do.46 But such a test would interject
unnecessarily complicated issues of the type of work a disabled claimant is
capable of performing. Moreover, although the claimant may be physically
able to perform lighter work, he may not be able to find a suitable job for
a temporary period. Thus under the proposed test, he would receive neither
disability benefits nor wages.47
In addition to requiring a certain degree of disability, the statutes impose
a waiting period of seven days from the beginning of disability before pay-
ments can be made.48 Some waiting period is justifiable because it will remove
incentive to malingering and because the volume of very short-lived disa-
bilities is too great for effective administration. 49 The period, however, should
wide disability risks must include work-connected injuries and illness. Otherwise the
disability fund would be making benefit payments without corresponding contributions to
it. Whether Rhode Island overlooked this point is not known. But one reason for the
threatened insolvency of that state's fund was frequent payment of disability and work-
men's compensation benefits for the same mishap. MUNTz, GROWTH AID TRENDs IN
SOCIAL SECURITY, NICB, STUDiEs No. 6, 92 (1949).
45. See, e.g., N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, § 201(8): "'Disability' during employment
means the inability of an employee, as a result of injury or sickness not arising out of
and in the course of employment, to perform the regular duties of his employment or the
duties of another employment which his employer may offer him at his regular wages
and which his injury or sickness does not prevent him from performing." In the case
of a disabled unemployed: "'Disability' . . . means the inability of an employee, . . . to
perform the duties of any employment for which he is reasonably qualified by training and
experience." Ibid.
46. See FEDERAL SECURiTY AGENCY, TEmoRAI.v DISABILTY INSURANcE 7, 8 (rev. ed.
1949).
47. For an illustration of this effect see ibid.
48. All the existing laws have a seven day waiting period with one exception for
hospitalized claimants in California (see note 50 infra). See, e.g., CAL. GEN. LAWs act
8780d, §205(b) (1947); N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, §§204(1), 207(2).
Several states dispense with the waiting period requirement when a subsequent dis-
ability related to the initial malady occurs within a specified period after the first illness.
The purpose of this waiver is to prevent hardship on a claimant who is, in effect, suffer-
ing from one disability. Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 1441, § 205 (b) (two weeks) ; N. Y. Laws,
1949, c. 600, §204(1) (three months). Only one waiting period a year is required by
Rhode Island. R. I. Acts, 1942, c. 1200, § 6(2).
49. A survey shows that about 50% of all disabilities last less than seven days.
GAFAFER (editor), MANUAL OF INDUSTRIAL HYGIENE AND MEDICAL SERVICE IN WAR
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not be too long--certainly no longer than a week. Many workers will prob-
ably be able to tide themselves over a brief period of income loss. But they
may find it impossible to save enough for family necessities over a long span,
especially when medicines and doctor's services are required.
California has recently amended its statute to eliminate any waiting period
when a claimant is hospitalized. 50 Other states might well follow suit. Since
hospitalization often means expensive medical services, the personal savings
of a hospitalized worker may be insufficient to defray costs of even seven
days' illness. Furthermore, hospitalization generally follows a severe dis-
ability. This, coupled with close hospital supervision, may make malingering
more difficult. It also means that many hospitalized workers are incapacitated
for more than seven days. As a result, no administrative problem would be
presented in such cases, since a claim for benefits would ordinarily be filed
after the eighth day anyway.
BENEFITS
The benefits provided by disability insurance are capable of fulfilling two
functions: they may indemnify the disabled breadwinner when normal income
ceases; and they may aid rehabilitation by providing medical diagnosis and
therapy for the disabling illness or injury. With one slight exception, state
programs provide only indemnification benefits.
Indemnification
Determination of the amount of the cash benefit requires a compromise
between two often conflicting considerations. The purpose of disability insur-
ance is to maintain the worker during interruption of earnings with as little
as possible alteration of his usual standard of living. 1 Therefore benefits
INDUsTRIEs 436 (1943). On the salutary administrative effect of a waiting period, see
FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, TEmPORARY DISABI ITY INSURANCE 16 (rev. ed. 1949).
50. Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 951, § 209.
51. Perhaps the most extreme expression of this view is represented by the Beveridge
plan. The essential thrust of Beveridge's philosophy is to insure the maintenance of the
population at a subsistence level. The benefit is deliberately based upon a calculated
minimum subsistence budget. See SIR WimuLi BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND
AumD SERvicEs 14, 15, 54-55, 76-90 (1942) ; PINx, Fazmom FRom FEAR 36, 40 (1944) ;
Burns, Unemployient Compensation and Socio-Economic Objectives, 55 YALE L. J. 1
(1945).
At the other extreme are the American compensation acts, where indemnity for loss,
not subsistence income is the keynote. Benefits are based upon a scale of normal wages
for the individual. Usually 50% of those wages constitute the benefit amount, with
minimum and maximum limits set, and without regard to wage levels. Since the maxi-
mum benefit is a small amount, workers without high wages will receive much less than
50% of their wages. The modern laws, however, are gradually leaning toward the
maintenance theory. Witness the Washington and' Wyoming compensation laws where
fixed amounts are paid, depending upon the number of dependents. For an analysis of fac-
tors occasioning the trend toward maintenance, see Burns, supra, at 16; Burns, Social
Insurance in Evolution, 34 Am. EcoN. RPv. Su'. No. 1, 199 (1944).
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should be a substantial proportion of wages. On the other hand, benefits
which approximate the wage earner's regular income may reduce his incentive
to return to work. Therefore, sufficient margin must be kept between benefits
and what can be earned in employment.5
2
Present statutes attempt a compromise by fixing minimum and maximum
benefit limits. To assure the disabled worker a maintenance income, each
of the laws prescribes minimum weekly cash benefits-$9 in New Jersey, 3
$10 under the other three laws. 54 Maximum benefits are set at a low figure
to discourage malingering and to keep down the cost of the program. Thus
New Jersey limits the benefit amount to $2 2 ,1
5 while Rhode Island and
California, specify $25,11 and New York $26.57 Within the minimum and
maximum limits the worker's weekly benefit rate varies with the amount
of wages earned during a preceding base period. 5s
The attempted compromise has resulted in benefits which fall short of
adequately indemnifying workers. Existing laws fail to recognize that the
hardships of disability fall on the family, not merely on the individual. A
satisfactory minimum income for a family of four is approximately $3,000
per year, or nearly $60 a week. 59 And such a family has but a negligible
52. Malingering always has been a major fear of social insurance planners. They
abhor the circumstances which may lead to a lazy reliance upon government for support.
Hence two safeguards are established: small benefits in proportion to wages, and eligibility
provisions which must give assurance that the claimant is normally part of the labor force.
53. N. J. Laws, 1948, c. 110, §§ 14, 16.
54. CAL. GEN. LAws act 8780d, §§ 54, 203 (1947); Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 1441, § 53;
R. I. Acts, 1942, c. 1200, § 5(4); R. I. Acts, 1949, c. 2194, §§ 5(2) (3).
55. N. J. Laws, 1948, c. 110, §§ 14, 16.
56. R. I. Acts, 1949, c. 2194, §§5(2) (3); Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 1441, §§ 53, 54.
57. N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, § 204(2).
58. The amount of the benefit depends on the claimant's earnings during a specified
calendar year or the highest quarter thereof prior to the time the claim is filed. See, e.g.,
Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 1441, §54. But cf. N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, §§204(2), 201(12):
weekly compensation equals half the claimant's average weekly wage during the last
eight weeks of employment preceding the disability.
The following excerpt from the California statute illustrates how benefits are related
to past earnings:
Amount of wages in
highest quarter of weekly benefit
base period amount
$ 75.00-$199.99 ................................... $10
240.00- 259.99 ................................... 13
300.00- 319.99 ................................... 16
380.00- 419.99 ................................... 20
500.00- 539.99 ................................... 23
580.00 and over ................................... 25
59. The median income of families in the United States in 1947 was $3,031. However,
the median for families with four or more children was $2,731 in the same year. It cost
city families with four children from $3,004 to $3,458, depending on price levels in
different cities, to purchase the most modest living. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL
SECURITY ADmNISTRATiON, ANNUAL REPORT 1949, 148-149 (1950).
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margin of savings.60 Yet the highest disability benefit rate is $26 a week.61
Moreover, since benefits are in proportion to past earnings, the lower paid
workers, who have fewer savings, receive less than $26.62
The inadequacy of present benefits can be overcome by including an allow-
ance for the disabled worker's dependents.68 Three dollars weekly for each
child, for example, and from $5 to $10 for a spouse would do much to relieve
the financial hardships engendered by disability.64 Such dependents' allow-
ances are entirely feasible under disability programs. They have already
60. "One evidence of the difficulties families have been having in meeting the mount-
ing cost of living is the fact that early in 1949, 29 percent of all United States families
had no liquid assets. In 1948, 3 in every 10 families spent more than they received that
year." Id. at 149. See also Ellickson, Labor's Dernand For Real Employment Security,
55 YALE L. J. 253, 255 (1945).
61. I.e., New York State. See note 57 supra.
62. See note 58 supra. Benefits are in proportion to past earnings in unemployment
insurance also. Of this it was said: "For extension of coverage is of no advantage to
low paid groups ... unless the benefits make at least a substantial contribution to living
expenses, and this can certainly not be assured so long as the present automatic relation-
ship to past wages is retained." Bums, Unemployment Compensation and Socio-Economic
Objectives, 55 YAxLE L. J. 1, 16 (1945). In addition, "[w]eekly benefit payments at best
run only about 50 to 60 percent of wages while, for the higher wage workers, weekly
benefits may be as low as a third or a quarter of wages. An extremely rough calculation
made in the Bureau of Employment Security indicates that for the year 1944 the average
benefits paid would have been about one-third of average wages in the states." Clague, The
Economics of Unemployment Compensation, 55 YALE L. J. 53 (1945). See also EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY I&Mo. No. 5, UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION, CONTRIBUTIONS, BENE-
FITS AND REsERvEs 17 (1940). During the third quarter of 1949, of the 16,373 claims
paid by the California state disability fund 1,595 were $20 or less. This figure includes both
men and women. State of California, Dep't of Employment Report 1031 #5, table 3 (1949).
63. "Present benefit rates are governed solely by prior earnings. One claimant gets
more simply because he was fortunate enough to earn more in the past though he has
only himself to provide for, while another who has a family to support and for whom
unemployment is immeasurably the greater disaster gets less because he earned less,
though that in itself makes his position the more precarious. The monies which we
provide for unemployment insurance are social funds and must be distributed not just to
increase the general income of the claimants but to meet the underlying social need. So
that unemployment insurance in our State may deal with insecurity realistically and
so that the funds may be spent most effectively and most economically, our formula
should differentiate between those who have only themselves to look after and those
with family responsibilities." REPORT OF THE NEW YORX STATE ADvisoRY COUNCIL ON
PLACEMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR THE YrA 1947, 5-6. The need may
be even greater in cases of disability because, in addition to normal basic necessities,
medical services often must be purchased.
64. The payment of dependents' allowances meets, to some extent, the increased
cost of basic necessities for larger-sized families. Actually, a $3 weekly benefit for
dependent children would be very modest. Each additional family member increases,
in 34 cities, the total weekly cost of goods and services for a family by about $10. For
example, in Detroit, basic living costs for a single person is estimated at $26.31, while
for a family of two it becomes $37.23, for a family of three, $47.87, and for four, $57.19.
11 SocIAL SECURITY BULL. No. 4, 9 (Apr. 1948). See generally id. at 3-9.
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worked successfully in five states with unemployment insurance,65 in ten
states with workmen's compensation, 6 and on a national scale with the old
age insurance system.
67
Duration of weekly payments is limited by two factors. Total benefits
available to any claimant during a year's period are directly proportional to
his previous income during a base year. 8 When weekly benefit payments
exhaust this total, they cease. In any event payments are restricted to a
maximum of twenty-six weeks per year.6 9 Thus lower paid workers will
have fewer compensable weeks than their higher salaried brethren.70 Because
65. Connecticut, District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Michigan and Nevada.
6-6. Ten states, including Massachusetts, provide dependents' allowances during
periods of temporary total disability. "Similar recognition of social need is to be
found in the New York workmen's compensation act in the provision which it makes
for widows and orphans of those killed in industrial accidents." REPORT OF THE NEw
YORK STATE ADvISORY COUNCIL ON PLACEMENT AND UNElIPLOYMENT INSURANCE FOR
THE YEAR 1947, 8.
67. OASI increases the monthly annuity in cases where dependents exist. For




Worker with no dependents ...................... $26.20
Worker with wife .............................. 41.00
Survivor families
Aged widow ................................... $20.70
Widow with one child ........................... 36.30
FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINIsTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1949,
28 (1950).
68. See e.g., R. I. Acts, 1949, c. 2194, § 5 (2) Table A. Tq illustrate, following is an
excerpt from the total benefits table in the Rhode Island statute:
Total Wages in Base Perioda Total Benefit Credits
$ 100.00- 199.99 ................................... $ 52.00
200.00- 299.99 ................................... 78.00
900.00- 999.99 ................................... 260.00
1500.0 - 1599.99 ................................... 416.00
2300.00 -2399.99 ................................... 624.00
2400.00 - and over .................................. 650.00
a Base period is defined in note 34 supra.
New York has an entirely different method. It uniformly limits duration to a maxi-
mum of 13 weeks, with no regard to previous income. N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, § 205(1).
69. See, e.g., N. 3. Laws, 1948, c. 110, § 15(a). New York is an exception. Its
maximum is 13 weeks. See note 68 supra.
70. The following table indicates how a worker would fare under the Rhode Island
Statute:
Wages Earned Total Weekly Duration of
in Base Year Benefits Benefit- Benefitsb
$ 100 ................. $ 52 $10 5 + weeks
200 ................. 78 10 7+
1,000 ................. 286 15 19
2,000 ................. 546 25 21
2,400 or over ......... 650 25 26
a These figures are taken from 1. I. Acts, 1949, c. 2194, § 5(3) Tables A and B.
b Duration is determined by dividing the weekly benefit into total benefits.
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the former suffer more frequent and prolonged disabilities,7 1 and have less
resources to begin with, such a limitation appears unwise. All workers,
regardless of their past wages, should receive benefits for twenty-sLx weeks
per year if their disabilities last that long.
72
Rehabilitation
Without health insurance there is generally no way for a disabled worker
to secure adequate medical care. He must rely on charity, go into debt, or
forego medical treatment at the risk of aggravating his disability.
The assumptions that underlie disability programs warrant provision for
medical benefits. 73 The statutes assume an illness or accident necessitating
at least some medical attention, since they require certification by a doctor.
7 4
Moreover, many instances of disability for seven days, the required waiting
period, need extensive professional therapy. By providing cash benefits the
statutes presuppose that the worker and his family are in dire economic
straits. Furthermore, temporary disability is the key-note of the system.
Quick recovery and early return to work are contemplated.75 If adequate
In New York this could not occur, because a total benefits figure is not used. In that
State the weekly benefit, see note 58 supra, must be paid up to a maximum of 13 weeks to
anyone whose disability lasts that long.
71. See note 7 supra.
72. Though arbitrary, twenty-six weeks seems reasonable. The purpose of disability
insurance is to protect individuals from the economic hardships of temporary sickness, not
of permanent or extended ill-health. Although permanent impairment of earning power
also means economic disaster for the ordinary wage earner, he can be better protected
under an amendment to OASI. Withdrawal from the labor market because of total in-
capacitation is in effect premature superannuation and more closely related to old age
than to the relatively short disability-induced lay-off.
Thirty countries connect permanent disability insurance with old age and survivors'
insurance. Since 1940, the Social Security Administration has consistently recommended
establishment of extended disability insurance with old age insurance. McCamman,
Disability Protection Under Public Programs, 11 SOCIAL SECURITY BULL. No. 6, 4-13
(June 1948); FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, TEMPORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE 1-2 (rev.
ed. 1949). A new title was added to OASI by the 1950 Amendments, providing grants to
states for aid to the permanently and totally disabled. Pub. L. No. 734, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. § 351 (Aug. 28, 1950), U. S. CODE CONG. Smv. 634-637 (1950). This is by no means
an attempt to establish comprehensive extended disability insurance. For example, a per-
son whose disability is expected to incapacitate him for two years would not be entitled
to aid. Disability must not only be total, but permanent.
73. As to the type of medical services that could be rendered see note 94 infra. Medi-
cal benefits provided in Workmen's Compensation are explained in REnE, ADEQUACY OF
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 156-166 (1947). See also the discussion of the Ives, Austin,
Halpern and Condon bills in New York calling for a health insurance program in that
State, in NICB, COMPULSORY SICKNESS CO11PENSATION FOR NEw YORK STATE 50-54,
152-161 (1947).
74. The nature and probable length of the disability must be certified by a doctor.
See, e.g., N. J. Laws, 1948, c. 110, § 7.
75. Two factors are evidence of this: a) Duration of payments is limited to 26 weeks
(13 weeks in New York) ; b) Dollar amount of benefits is kept low to minimize malin-
gering.
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diagnosis and therapy at an early stage of disability are neglected, either the
period of disability is likely to be extended or the laborer may resume normal
duties before he has fully recuperated, thus permanently impairing his health.
An initial forward step has been taken by California. That state now
provides immediate reimbursement of hospital expenses up to $8 a day for
12 days.76 Other states have not followed its example. Perhaps as they come
to realize that medical benefits for the worker are not only essential, but
entirely feasible, they will integrate them into the present systems.
FINANCING THE PLAN
There are two available methods of financing disability plans. A payroll
tax may be imposed on covered employment; or funds may be secured from
the general revenues of the state, so that all members of the community,
whether covered or not, pay the cost.
The existing statutes have relied exclusively on the payroll tax. California
and Rhode Island finance their programs solely by employee contributions of
one percent of yearly wages up to $3,000. 77 New York and New Jersey
require joint contributions from employers and employees 78 which also total
one percent of payrolls.
79
76. Cal. Stats., 1949, c. 951, § 209.
77. CAL. GEN. LAWs act 8780, §§ 44, 400 (1947) ; R. I. Acts, 1942, c. 1200, § 4(1).
These states were among the few that levied one percent payroll tax on employees for
purposes of unemployment insurance. Since the unemployment insurance funds in those
states contained considerable reserves, the one percent tax on employees was diverted to
disability insurance programs. In effect, then, no new tax was levied to establish the
disability program.
78. In New Jersey, employees sustain three-quarters of this 1% contribution. Em-
ployers pay from .1 to .75% of payrolls, depending on merit rating, see pages 664-65 infra,
and the condition of the insurance fund. N.J. Laws, 1948, c. 109, §§ 1 (d) (e). In New
York, the maximum employee tax is .50% of payrolls, instead of .75%, and employers
are required to contribute whatever additional cost is necessary under their plans. N.Y.
Laws, 1949, c. 600, §§209(3), 210(2).
79. One percent of covered payrolls is generally considered sufficient to cover disability
benefits as now constituted. Although Rhode Island's program came dangerously close
to insolvency in 1946, see notes 38 and 45 supra, experience in other states indicates that
1% is more than enough. California's record for example proves that 1% may be an
overestimate; during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1948, benefit costs were 0.41% of
payrolls. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL
REPORT 1948, 139 (1949). In a two year period California revenues amounted to $90.6
million, while benefit payments totaled $22.7 million and administrative costs were
$2.5 million. FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, CALIFORNIA DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM
18 (1948). Despite this favorable experience, a state embarking on a disability insurance
program should not specify contributions at less than 1% of wages. Part of the fund
must be reserved for such contingencies as epidemic or unemployment. In addition,
conditions in California may not exist elsewhere. The health record, adequacy of medical
facilities, level of income, age and sex of the community, and costs of living-all factors
which ultimately influence the cost of disability insurance-vary considerably from state
to state.
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Where a state relies either partially or exclusively on a payroll tax,
participation by both employers and employees seems advisable. Employers
benefit considerably from disability insurance. By relieving workers of finan-
cial difficulties resulting from sickness, the programs tend to aid workers'
recovery and thereby reduce absenteeism and cut employers' costs.8 0 The
programs also help to improve the general level of health within the state.
The cash payments further benefit employers by maintaining purchasing
power. Finally, most of the employers' burden often can be shifted to the
consuming public so that ultimately the entire community participates in
financing.81
Employees, who benefit most directly from disability insurance, should also
bear part of the cost of the program. But their contribution should not be
great. Even though they may be able to shift part of their cost to the employer,
this may be unlikely where strong unions are not present. Furthermore, as
consumers, workers may be forced to bear a part of the employers' burden.
A matching rate of 0.5 percent of payrolls on employers and employees would
be both a light load for each party and sufficient for present benefits.82 An
expanded program should likewise be covered by mutually equivalent payments.
Adjusting each employer's contribution rate according to the rate of
disability experienced among his employees has been advocated as a method
of computing employers' contributions.83 "Experience rating" is extensively
A highly significant aspect of costs is that part of available funds allocated for
administrative purposes. Experience with the operating programs suggests that the
cost sufficient for effective administration will be less than 5% of the total revenues.
However, prescribing slightly more than is actually needed is not unwise.
Inefficient administration can destroy the effectiveness of disability insurance as a
social security device. One of the outstanding features of these programs is that the
disabled worker receives his benefits when he most needs them-within a week after he
becomes disabled. A tortured claims procedure would vitiate this advantage. Moreover,
laxity in checking claims results in malingering and unnecessary costs. Greater efficiency
in system operation, in the long run, will decrease costs and make available more funds
for additional benefits.
80. See MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, LAaoR's RISKS AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 238 (1938):
.. illness .. . adds to the employers' costs through unbalanced sections which
require substitutions of men on the job, and through increased labor turnover. The
reduction of output becomes more severe in highly integrated industries, where, for
example, the absence of a key man may disrupt a whole assembly line."
81. The employers' contribution, a cost of production, often can be spread over a
large number of consumers who pay for it in higher prices. Where the demand is
elastic, however, employers may not be able to shift the tax because higher prices would
decrease demand. Sometimes employers could pass the tax off on their employees in
the form of a refusal to raise wages, especially where the labor organization is weak,
or where none exists. See NAT'L REsouRcEs PLANNING BD., SECURITY, WORK, AND
RELIEF POLICIES 524 (1942).
82. The New York law comes closest to this even match. See note 78 supra.
83. New Jersey already has such a provision. N. J. Laws, 1948, c. 109, §§ 1(d) (e).
Experience rating or merit rating refers to methods by which individual employer
contribution rates may be varied from the standard rate, in relation to the employer's
past disability record or benefit experience.
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used in unemployment insurance.8 4 Its proponents claim that it would focus
the interest of employers on industrial health within their establishments
and thus reduce disability.8 5 But disabilities which "arise in the course of
employment" are already covered by workmen's compensation. And other
disabilities, which are covered by disability insurance programs, are much
more likely to be incurred off the job than on it, especially since the average
worker spends only about 40 hours of the 168 hours in a week at his job.
The most direct way employers can influence the frequency and severity of
non-work-connected disabilities is through selective hiring. Such disabilities,
after all, are primarily determined by such factors as age, sex, housing, and
income. Thus experience rating may increase discrimination in hiring against
non-whites, women, older workers and those with chronic ailments. In addi-
tion, since merit rating depends in part on the number of claims paid, its use
may stimulate contests to assure a favorable experience factor.8 6
Two types of merit rating plans have developed out of unemployment insurance.
First, and the most common, is one in which all or a part of an employer's contributions
are credited to his account and the benefits paid to his disabled workers are charged
to his account. The ratio (reserve ratio) of the excess of contributions over benefits
(reserve balance) to his annual or average payroll serves as the basis for modifying
contribution rates. Second, variations in contribution rates are based on an index
derived by computing the ratio of the amount of wages the employer has paid to
his workers during the preceding several years who have subsequently drawn benefits
to his total payroll for that period. This benefit-wage ratio is usually called the
employer's experience factor.
These plans, as worked out in unemployment insurance, vary slightly from the
outline above. In many states the condition of the unemployment insurance fund is
taken into consideration in permitting reductions in rates, while in some, only the
status of the individual employer's account is considered. See Arnold, Experience Rathg,
55 YALE L.J. 218, 229 et seq. (1945); CURRENT EXPERIENcE RATING RESEARCH
APPENDIX B (Social Security Board, Employment Security Memo. No. 7, 1940).
84. Experience rating forms an integral part of all but six state programs. The
six require a uniform payroll tax. Arnold, supra note 83, at 219. For a discussion
of weaknesses of experience rating provisions of existing state laws and proposals for
a different plan with hypothetical examples, see PRiBRAm & BOOTH, MERIT RATING AND
UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION (Soc. Sec. Bd. 1937).
85. Two objectives are claimed for experience rating: (1) reduction of disability
by inducing employers to improve health factors in the plant, and (2) allocation of
the social costs of disability to the individual business concerns largely responsible for
those costs. See Arnold, supra note 83, at 219.
Of unemployment insurance it was said: "Supporters of experience rating point to
the more than six billion dollars in the state unemployment funds as one justification
of the lower tax rates. They even argue that most state funds are adequate in view
of existing benefit provisions. But this is no answer when benefit provisions are
deficient." Ellickson, Labor's Demand for Real Employment Security, 55 YALE L.J.
253, 256 (1945).
86. See FEDERAL SECURITY AGENCY, TEMPORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE 51 (rev.
ed. 1949). For a summary of labor's objections to experience rating in general, see
AFL, WHY MUST WE REPEAL MERIT RATING PROVISIONS IN UNEMPLOYMENT COMPEN-
SATION (1938).
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In lieu of the payroll tax, a state many choose to finance a program from
its annual general revenues. The disability risk is in reality a social problem
with which the entire community should concern itself. Spreading the cost
would be especially useful in times of depression to help alleviate the tax
burden on employers and employees.8 7 And should states remain unwilling to
tax government units and non-profit organizations, general appropriations
would facilitate coverage of employees of these organizations. s8 Basically,
however, general revenue financing is subject to defects similar to the payroll
tax.8 9 Since under present laws general state funds are not garnered prin-
cipally through graduated income taxes,90 the method is no less regressive
than a payroll tax. In periods of recession both taxes decrease purchasing
power where it is most needed.9'
The use of general revenues to supplement payroll taxes, however, might
be advantageous. 92  It would enable a state to accumulate a strong reserve
fund to meet such contingencies as depression and epidemic.93 And with more
funds thus made available benefits can be extended to an adequate level. For
87. From today's viewpoint the immediate future bears little prospect for a decline
in employment. But disability insurance is a long range plan. As long as there is a
possibility of a rescession it must be planned for in advance. See Comment, 59
YALE L.J. 292, 315 (1950).
88. Such a method could also ensure mandatory coverage of all self-employed
persons. The objection to covering the self-employed, i.e., the difficulty in collecting
a payroll tax from one who does not earn regular weekly or periodical wages, would
no longer obtain.
89. The principal arguments against general revenue financing are first, that
disability compensation should not depend on political cross currents and legislative
economy drives, and second, that a social insurance program should be truly "insurance,"
meaning that those who are insured should pay the cost (i.e., premiums). MOTT &
ROEMER, RURAL HEALTH AND MEDICAL CARE 486 (1949).
90. Census figures for 1948 show that 16 states have no individual income taxes
and 15 have no corporate income taxes. In the remaining states, income taxes amounted
to a little less than 14% of total revenues. Total revenues in all states was $7,790,984
in 1948. $499,445 of this total represented individual income taxes and $584,823 cor-
poration income taxes. THE BOOK OF STATES 1950-1951, 254-55, Table 3.
91. HARRIS, THa EcONOMICs OF SOCIAL SECURITY 69-96 (1941).
92. "The Social Security Administration believes that a comprehensive contributory
social insurance system should be financed in part through a Government contribution as
well as the contributions of employers and employees. Provision for Government contri-
bution for old-age and survivors insurance, if receipts from pay-roll taxes should become
insufficient, is already on the statute books. A three-way division of cost makes possible
a fair assessment of the three types of responsibility inherent in social insurance-indi-
vidual, industrial, and social. Since a very large proportion of the population would have
protection under such a system, a Government contribution from general tax funds would
be warranted. The stabilizing effects of a comprehensive and adequate system would be
of importance even for persons who did not share in it directly, and public costs otherwise
necessary for assistance would be gradually reduced as the insurance system took over
responsibilities that must now be financed from general tax funds." FDERA. SECURITY
AGENCY, SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, ANNUAL REPORT 1949, 7 (1950).
93. OASI already has a comparable scheme. See note 92 supra.
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example, indemnification benefits, as well as some dependents' allowances and
medical services, might be attained at disability costs equal to three percent
of payrolls.94 These costs could be financed by contributions of one percent




A state embarking on a disability program can choose one of several insur-
ance systems within which to integrate coverage, benefits, and financing pro-
visions. It can establish a program operated exclusively by the state; impose
a duty upon all employers to insure their own employees, either privately or
with the state; or set up a state plan but later permit substituted coverage under
private plans approved by a state agency.
Ezlusive State Fund. Under the exclusive state fund all contributions are
paid to the state, and all benefits are paid by the state. As operated by Rhode
Island,9 5 the system is coordinated with unemployment insurance. For ad-
ministrative purposes, coverage is identical under both insurance laws and
the wage records maintained for unemployment insurance are also used for
disability insurance.90
94. On March 7, 1945, the Ives Bill was introduced in the New York State Assembly.
It called for health insurance to the same groups of employees covered by unemployment
insurance. No cash disability benefits were provided. For medical benefits alone, the
Ives Bill demanded a 2% levy on wages. NICB, CoMPuLsoRY SICKNESS COmPENSATION
FOR NEW YORK STATE 52, 160 (1947). Since cash disability benefits can be financed at
1% of payrolls, see note 79 supra, an integrated program would cost 3%.
Among the medical benefits contemplated by the Ives Bill were such basic services as
diagnostic and therapeutic treatment by physicians, X-ray treatments, hospitalization for
21 days, drugs, a general health examination by a physician once a year for an insured
and for each of his dependents, and dental services. Additional services could be granted
if the financial resources of the fund warranted them. These included increased hospitaliza-
tion periods, additional drugs, medical, dental and optometrical services. Id. at 53. If
these benefits look too good to be true at the price (2%), some can be cut. For the
purposes of disability insurance (not health insurance), for instance, yearly examinations
and medical benefits to dependents are unnecessary. The worker needs insurance when
unable to draw regular income, i.e., when disabled. So long as he is physically fit, and
working, he is more able to pay for both his own check-ups, as well as his dependent's.
Over generalization as to cost is unwise because of wide variations from state to state
in disability factors, medical facilities and cost of living. See note 79 supra. But 3%
should be able to buy considerable benefits everywhere.
95. See MUNTZ, GROWTH AND TRENDS IN SOCIAL SECURITY, NICB, STUDmIS No. 6,
88-93 (1949).
96. An exhaustive analysis of the exclusive state fund, as compared with other
bystems of assuring coverage can be found in STUDIES in DISABILITY INsURANcE 75
et seq. (N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949).
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Employer Liability with Competitive State Fund. In contrast to the ex-
clusive state fund, employer liability with competitive state fund permits em-
ployers to establish private plans, either by purchasing group insurance policies
from commercial carriers or by self-insurance. A state insurance fund is
established to afford protection to poorer risks rejected by private insurance,
but any employer may insure in this fund. Claims must be presented directly to
the employer, and are paid by his insurerY7 The state agency administering
the law exercises general supervision over all plans, to see that they provide
specified minimum benefits at no more than maximum employee assessments.
New York, which has enacted this system,98 provides for administration by its
Workmen's Compensation Board. That state has also established a special
state fund to cover the disabled unemployed who have no employers to whom
they can present their claims.9 9 This special fund is financed by assessments
on insurance companies, self-insurers, and the state insurance fund. 00
Contracting-Out. California ' 01 and New Jersey ' 0 2 have adopted a so-called
"contracting-out" system which is quite similar to the employer liability with
competitive state fund system. Under contracting-out, a state benefit fund is
established to which all contributions are made unless a state-approved private
insurance plan is substituted by employer-employee agreement. 03 The private
plan may be underwritten by a commercial carrier or sustained by self-insur-
ance. Payments for the private plan may be made by employees, subject to
the statutory maximum established for the state fund. Any additional costs
must be satisfied by the employer.104 Workers must file their claims with the
insurer-state or private-under whose plan they are covered at the time they
97. I.e., either by a private insurance company or by the state fund, depending
upon which the employer is insured with.
98. N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600 §211. This system is modeled after New York's
workmen's compensation law.
99. Id. § 214.
100. Ibid.
101. See description of California's law in MUNTZ, op. cit. mspra note 95, at 93-98;
FEDERAL SEcURITY AGENCY, CALIFORNIA DISABILITY INSURANCE PROGRAM 5, 20
et seq. (1948).
102. See MUNTZ, op. cit. supra note 95, at 98-102; STUDIES IN DISABILITY INSUR-
ANCE 35-39 (N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949).
103. In requiring employee approval before an employer can use a private insurer,
contracting-out differs from the employer liability system. But in other respects the
two systems are very much alike, except for the fact that in the beginning, at least, a
contracting-out system will have a much greater percentage of employers covered by
the state fund. In the long run, however, so many firms may contract out of the state
fund that the ratio between state and private plan coverage in both systems will
become equal.
104. In California, for example, employees are not required to contribute to private
plans. If they do, the 1% maximum established for the state fund applies. Although
employers do not contribute to the state plan they can bear the entire cost of a private
plan. Cal. Gen. Laws § 456 (1947).
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become disabled. The state agency handles contested claims for all plans, and
administration is coordinated with unemployment insurance.
Choice of System
Many arguments are marshalled in support of the employer liability and
contracting-out systems. 0 5 Private plans can more readily adjust the particu-
lar needs and risks in the individual plant. And administration, being closer
to the industrial establishments, tends to be more efficient.10 6 In addition, com-
petition among insurance carriers assures strict policing of claims and stimu-
lates efforts to extend the greatest benefit at the lowest premium. 0 7
The defects in the employer liability and contracting-out systems, however,
outweigh their advantages. Since private plans tend to select the employers
who hire better disability risks, under these systems employers of poorer
risks would have to be covered by a state fund. 08 Thus annual contributions
105. Many have pitched their arguments on a politically emotional level. See,
e.g., Zucker, The New York Disability Benefits Law-The Model Approach, 4 INDUS-
TRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS RaV. 420 (1951). For more factual analyses see STUDIES
IN DIsABLiTy INSURANCE 75 et seq. (N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949); FEDERAL SECURITY
AGENCY, TEMIORARY DISABILITY INSURANCE 36-45 (rev. ed. 1949); The New York
Disability Benefit System, 4 INDUSTRIAL AND LAEoR RELATIONS REv. 415-438 (1951).
106. See STUDIES IN DISABILIT INSURANCE 94 (N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949).
107. Another argument is made that it is easier for a group to increase their
protection on their own without waiting for legislative action affecting the entire
state. Hence greater immediate benefits can be expected. STUDIEs I_ DisABIITY
INSURANCE 93 (N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949). But a similar argument can be made in
support of an exclusive state fund. Private insurance can supplement the state program.
See page 671 infra.
108. Groups with better than average disability experience would benefit from con-
tracting-out. They could secure greater benefits for the same cost or equal benefits
for a lower cost. Groups with poorer experiences would have to pay as much or more
for the same benefits with private insurance. It is to their advantage therefore to
remain in the state fund. Thus gradually the state fund will find itself covering
poorer risks. For an excellent discussion see STUDIES IN DISABrLITY INSURANCE 87-92
(N. Y. Dep't Labor 1949).
Early experience in California indicates that state-plan workers are older than the
aggregate of private plan workers. In addition the state plan includes a much greater
percentage of women, workers with lower average wages, and less regular employment.
Ibid.
Several solutions to adverse selection have been proferred. The California law
gives discretion to the state agency to disapprove private plans which tend toward
adverse risk selection. To date only one test has been devised. The aggregate voluntary
plan coverage of each carrier must include at least 20% female workers. Any
plan which would bring below 20%7 the number of female workers covered by a carrier
will be disapproved. Note, however, that the state plan nevertheless contains a higher
proportion of women covered. Another proposal was made in the New Jersey legislature.
Those who contract-out from state plan coverage normally are excused from contribu-
tions to the state. But under this proposal they would continue to be obligated to pay
from .17o to .25% to the state plan, depending on the amount required to main-
tain equal loss-ratios between state and private plans. The proposal was defeated, how-
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to this fund may not be adequate to cover its disbursements. ° 9 Private plans
are also less effective because the selling expenses of private carriers, and their
need to show profits, mean that a smaller proportion of the premium dollar
can be utilized for benefits.110 And since a state agency must police private
plans, such plans present greater administrative problems and increase the
costs of an entire program. Finally, adoption of empoyer's liability or con-
tracting-out makes financing through general revenues less likely, since a
legislature may balk at appropriating state revenues to pay premiums to
private insurance companies.
In contrast the features of an exclusive state fund demonstrate its desir-
ability. Since all workers, both good and bad risks, are covered by one fund,
the financial dangers of adverse risk selection are avoided. Moreover, ad-
ministrative costs of a single state insurance fund are small, especially if
coordinated with unemployment insurance. n1 The exclusive fund also adds
simplicity of claims procedures,"12 and eliminates the need for a special fund
to cover the eligible unemployed. n 3
ever, upon the outcry of private insurance that such a tax would be a penalty tax, giving
unfair advantage to the state plan by discouraging contracting-out.
109. Since the state fund is left to cover poorer risks the rate of disability will be
higher than originally expected with all risks pooled under one plan. Costs will thus
be greater than 1% of payrolls. In addition higher paid workers are more likely to
contract-out of the state fund, leaving a smaller base for the 1% tax. See ibid.
110. For the period 1938-42 total expenses of commercial group insurance exclusive
of taxes, licenses and fees, came to 19% of premiums. And this figure does not account
for dividends or other refunds to policyholders. BLANCHARD, StmVEY OF ACCIDENT AND
HEALTH INSURANCE (Federal Security Agency, Bureau of Research and Statistics
Memo. No. 62, 1946). Hence of the premium dollar something less than 804 will be
channeled into benefits.
Typical expenses incurred are for investigation and adjustment, acquisition and field
supervision, general administration of inspection and bureau expenses, taxes, licenses
and fees, and dividends to policyholders.
111. No acquisition costs or profit motive attend an exclusive state fund. And when
coordinated with unemployment insurance, wage records and employers' accounts need
not be duplicated. The same argument, however, supports coordination with workmen's
compensation. In fact the latter has an additional advantage. In the event that disability
benefits are extended to include medical services, workmen's compensation agencies
already have the trained personnel and mechanics to handle the special problems thereby
created. Unemployment insurance boards do not.
112. Under one overall insuring body, claim forms, physicians' reports and pro-
cedural regulations easily can be made uniform. No difficulty arises from employers
shifting their insurance from state fund to numerous private carriers or self-insurance.
Claimants need direct their attention to but one insurer.
113. A private plan covers only workers actually employed or those who fall
sick within a short time after becoming unemployed. In New Jersey the
private carrier is responsible for benefits for two weeks after the worker leaves the
employ of an insured employer. N. 3. Laws, 1948, c. 110, § 3(b). In New York the
period is four weeks. N. Y. Laws, 1949, c. 600, § 203. In California, the insurance
company is absolved from responsibility as soon as the worker terminates employment.
Cal. Adm. Code tit. 22, § 283 (d). But the private carrier cannot forever be responsible
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Even though the exclusive state fund system is adopted, commercial group
accident and health insurance need not be scrapped. Private plans can con-
tinue in operation to supplement, rather than substitute for, state fund
protection." 4  This would allow higher paid workers, the major buyers of
commercial insurance anyway, to help close the gap betveen wages lost and
state benefits paid.
THE NEED FOR FEDERAL SUPERVISION
To the extent that four states extend compulsory insurance to cover tem-
porary disabilities they are making a real contribution to the security of the
working population. The disability risk, however, is not confined to these
few states; the problem is nationwide. Yet progress among other states has
been slow.
Moreover, as now developing, state programs will result in a disparate
patchwork of coverage, benefits, financing, and administration. Such a hap-
hazard approach entails real dangers. Unequal insurance rates among the
states may lead to unequal costs among competing firms and a restriction of
coverage and benefit provisions. The emergence of many different plans with
myriad benefit provisions and qualifications may result in loss of protection to
employees who move from job to job or from state to state."n  And the
coexistence of public and private plans is an expensive and burdensome
method of insuring.
Therefore, a national approach to temporary disability insurance is needed
to obtain a single, uniform program. Minimum standards for finances,
coverage, and benefits could be established by -Congress through a new title to
the Social Security Act. Like unemployment insurance, credits could be
given against federal payroll tax liability for contributions to exclusive state
funds which meet minimum federal standards. Basic uniformity could thus
be assured. At the same tinie the program would be flexible enough for states
to make provision for varying risk and cost factors. States wishing to grant
more than the minimum benefits could do so. Moreover, decentralized ad-
ministration is more likely to afford individualized attention to the rank and
file in the labor force and facilitates strict checking of claims to prevent
malingering.
for paying benefits to unemployed workers. Such persons must look to the state. The
state can get funds to pay these benefits either from general revenues or from assess-
ments upon private carriers and self-insurers.
114. The exclusive state fund in Rhode Island has had a salutary effect on the business
of private health and accident insurance as a supplement to state insurance. Barkin,
Comments on The New York Disability Benefits System, 4 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR
RELATlONS R v. 429 (1951).
115. In this critical era of increased defense production, mobility of labor is desirable.
But if a worker is required to move from one employment to another, perhaps in a differ-
ent geographical area, he should not be in jeopardy of losing protection under disability
insurance. This may occur if eligibility requirements and benefits are not uniform
throughout the states.
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Social insurance has proved to be the most feasible way to help mitigate
the economic hardships which unemployment, industrial mishaps, old age and
death inflict upon workers and their families. The equally grave risk of
disability should be met in the same manner.
